The newbuilding market is in a rare long upcycle. Two institutional reports—from Clarksons Research and BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council)—corroborate the current high level of the global orderbook from different statistical dimensions. However, the difference between the two sets of indicators—gross tonnage (GT) and compensated gross tonnage (CGT)—also means the industry needs to distinguish between judgments on orderbook strength and delivery pressure.

The latest statistics from Clarksons Research show that as of the end of September 2026, the global shipyard orderbook hit a record high, totaling 9,699 vessels and 435.8 million GT, surpassing the previous record of 422 million GT in October 2008. In terms of the orderbook as a share of the fleet, the current orderbook in GT terms is equivalent to about 24% of the global active fleet in GT, compared with 52% at the peak of the previous shipbuilding cycle; the dilutive effect of this round of order expansion on existing capacity is therefore clearly weaker than it was then. Over the same period, the global operating fleet stood at 117,811 vessels and about 1.8 billion GT, with fleet GT up 4% year on year.

In terms of this year’s contracting pace, in the first nine months of 2026, 2,806 new ships were contracted globally, totaling 145.2 million GT. Clarksons commented that the current ordering pace is already close to the annual historical peak of 173.9 million GT for the whole of 2007.

Among them, green-powered vessel types became an important component of orders. In the first nine months, dual-fuel ship orders totaled 516 vessels, accounting for 18% of contracted vessels by number, corresponding to 44.4 million GT, or slightly more than 10% of total newbuilding orders in GT terms. Supply and demand both changed simultaneously: in the first three quarters, shipyards delivered 2,466 vessels, totaling 66.7 million GT, while ship demolition remained at only 5.5 million GT, indicating a slow pace of clearing out older vessels.

Notably, Clarksons also released a briefing over the same period based on CGT statistics, recording 2,558 newbuilding orders and 70.7 million CGT. The newbuilding counts in the two reports differ mainly because GT and CGT are two completely different statistical calibers; public materials have not yet provided a specific explanation for the difference in vessel numbers.

If switching to BIMCO’s CGT caliber, as of September 1, 2026, the global shipyard orderbook was 203.2 million CGT, up 13% year on year, also above the historical record of 195.4 million CGT in 2008, and still below the interim high of 210.4 million CGT in May this year. The core value of the CGT indicator is that it measures shipbuilding workload; it sets conversion coefficients according to ship type and construction difficulty. Compared with simple GT or vessel-count statistics, it is better suited to assessing shipyard production load. The CGT workload gap between small high-tech ships and large simple cargo ships is significant; therefore, CGT growth only represents an increase in construction workload and does not directly equate to future additional cargo capacity.

The distribution of the orderbook pie is already very clear. Over the past 12 months, in CGT terms, Chinese shipyards won 74% of global newbuilding contracting volume, and currently hold 64% of the global orderbook; South Korea and Japan accounted for 19% and 6%, respectively. Container ships are the main force driving this round of order growth: container ships account for 30% of the total orderbook in CGT terms and contributed 68% of the order increment over the past year. When placing orders, shipowners need to view regional aggregate data rationally: a country’s total order volume cannot be equated with the technical capability, scheduling stability, and performance record of each individual shipyard under its flag; delivery risk at individual shipyards still needs to be assessed separately.

Beneath the booming orders, the biggest test is concentrated in the ability to deliver on commitments. According to current schedules, the three major shipbuilding countries—China, South Korea, and Japan—are scheduled to deliver a combined 40.1 million CGT in 2025, with planned deliveries rising to 55.9 million CGT in 2027 and further to 60 million CGT in 2028. Among them, Chinese shipyards’ planned deliveries in 2028 reach 44 million CGT, almost double the actual deliveries of 22.7 million CGT in 2025. These planning figures are only scheduling targets, not locked-in completion volumes; to deliver on time, domestic shipyards need to achieve a substantial leap in production capacity.

The calculation of orderbook coverage years also depends heavily on the choice of capacity benchmark. Using each shipyard’s highest annual CGT output from 2021 to 2025 as the benchmark, Chinese shipyards’ orderbooks can support an average of 4.2 years of workload, while South Korea and Japan are at 1.9 years and 1.7 years, respectively; if using the highest planned capacity for 2021–2030 as the benchmark, China’s orderbook coverage falls to 2.1 years, and both South Korea and Japan are at 1.6 years.

Delivery pressure is not only a challenge at the shipyard final assembly stage. An OECD analysis points out that the shipbuilding industry is highly dependent on supporting supply chains; marine equipment, steel, coatings, and other intermediate inputs account for 70% to 80% of a ship’s final output value. Capacity expansion is a systemic project and requires upstream and downstream supporting manufacturers to keep pace with supply schedules. At the same time, the industry lacks unified and comparable statistics on labor and production efficiency, making it difficult to accurately predict potential skilled-labor gaps.

BIMCO also flagged the hidden concerns behind the cycle: production lines and supporting facilities expanded to take on this round of orders will face the risk of declining capacity utilization once subsequent newbuilding demand cools. For participants across the entire industrial chain, a massive orderbook is short-term business assurance, but the real test is whether plants, equipment delivery, and skilled workers can scale up in tandem—and whether they can still maintain their market competitiveness after this order wave recedes.